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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE TWELFTH JUDICIAL CIRCm.g §§ 
IN AND FOR MANATEE COUNTY, FLORIDA n 8 ' 
ST A TE OF FLORIDA, 
Plaintiff, 
On .&:-
~s -u 
o --..j ::It: 
A:t 
-8 w 
v. CASE NO: 
<::1 c::: " 2012;.CF-O~31 ~ 
SIV ASANKAR JOTHILINGAM, 
Defendant. 
_______________________________ 1 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS BASED ON 
ENTRAPMENT 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's "Amended Motion to Dismiss Based 
on Entrapment," filed April 16, 2013, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3 .190(b); and the hearing that 
was held on May 22, 2013. The Court has reviewed the motion, the evidence, the oral 
arguments, and the applicable law, and is otherwise duly advised in the premises. 
Factual Background 
The undisputed facts of this case, as presented at the hearing, are as follows. On or 
around September 12, 2012, Special Agent Keesha Woessner, I with the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement, placed an ad in the "Casual Encounters" section of Craig's List,2 with the 
subject of "too taboo for you?" in the "women for men" category. In order to place such an ad, 
Agent Woessner had to verify that she was at least eighteen (18) years of age or older. 
In response to the advertisement, Defendant sent Agent Woessner an electronic mail 
message stating, "26 years old thin indian guy here . .interested?,,3 Agent Woessner replied by 
stating that she was a "hot single mom of one looking to explore outside societal norms," and she 
I Agent Woessner represented herself as "Vanessa Lange." 
2 www.craigslist.org is a community-based website for local classified advertisements and community forums. 
3 To avoid redundancy and promote ease of reading, the Court will not "sic" all of the errors in the parties' email 
conversations. All matters in quotes are taken verbatim from the emails that were introduced at the hearing. 
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asked Defendant what he was "willing to do." Thereafter, the two engaged in a discussion of the 
meaning of "outside societal norms" and Agent Woessner pressed Defendant to tell her what he 
was interested in. Defendant responded with a description of sexual acts that he wanted to 
perform with Agent Woessner, whom he believed to be a "hot single mom of one." 
At that point, Agent Woessner shifted the conversation and stated, "I'm looking more for 
my 14 year old daughter . . . if you want me to be frank." As a result, the following email 
discussion ensued: 
Defendant: "oh .. you are asking me satisfy you & your daughter or 
all we 3 together???" 
Woessner: "for the time being I would like the focus to be on her. 
" 
Defendant: "oh .. great..i am ok with it if you both don't have any 
issues .. " 
Defendant: "hey i have a questionn since she is 14 years old is it 
not a problem to have sex legally? If cops come to know wont be 
in trouble? will it be safe? 
Woessner: "i don't know! are you a cop? you're scaring me." 
Defendant: "Hey no no am not..since am new to USA I just 
asked .. did u see my pic? Liked it?" 
Woessner: "I just want her to get some experience and learn what 
it is to be a woman. I just need to right man to do it so i'm very 
picky. What would you be willing to teach her?" 
Defendant: "ok .. ok I can teach her how a guy will look like 
without dress, how to behave with a guy in bed, how to please a 
guy .. how to make sex safe .. is this fine? or do you want more?" 
Woessner: "what exactly would you teach her in bed and how 
would you teach to be safe?" 
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At this point, after the parties had exchanged some 28 emails over a 5-hour period of time, 
Defendant provided Woessner with an explicit description of the sexual acts he would perform 
with the minor. 
Thereafter, the two arranged a time and place to meet, and Defendant continued to 
express his interest in Woessner, the "hot single mom," by asking for her picture, asking to 
"Skype" with her, and saying he was excited to see her. On September 13, 2012, Defendant 
arrived at the designated location and was immediately arrested. As a result, Defendant was 
charged by Information with Traveling to Meet a Parent to SolicitlEntice a Child to Commit a 
Sex Act, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 847.0135(4)(b) (Count I); and Use of a Computer to Solicit a 
Parent to Commit Sex Acts with a Child, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 847.0135(3)(b) (Count II). 
Legal Analysis 
In the present motion, Defendant moves for a dismissal of his charges on the grounds that 
he was entrapped by the government. An entrapment defense is meant to prevent a government 
agent from "originat[ing] a criminal design, implant[ing] in an innocent person's mind the 
disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induc[ing] commission of the crime so that the 
government may prosecute." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1992). 
Florida law recognizes both a due process entrapment defense and a subjective 
entrapment defense. Cabrera v. State, 766 So. 2d 1131, 1133 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The due 
process entrapment theory, which is often referred to as the objective theory of entrapment, 
"operates as a bar to prosecution in those instances where the government's conduct 'so offends 
decency or a sense of justice' that it amounts to a denial of due process." Davis v. State, 937 So. 
2d 300, 302 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (quoting State v. Blanco, 896 So. 2d 900, 901 (Fla. 4th DCA 
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2005); see also Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90, 98-99 (Fla. 1993). In the absence of egregious 
law enforcement conduct, a subjective entrapment analysis, as codified in Fla. Stat. § 777.201, is 
to be applied. Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. In his present motion, Defendant relies only on the 
subjective entrapment defense. 
The subjective entrapment analysis focuses on three issues. First, the defendant must 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a law enforcement officer, a person engaged in 
cooperation with a law enforcement officer, or a person acting as an agent of a law enforcement 
officer induced the defendant to commit the offense charged. Fla. Stat. § 777.201; and Munoz, 
629 So. 2d at 99. Second, the defendant must prove that he or she was not predisposed to 
commit the offense. Jd. Once the defendant has satisfied this initial burden, the prosecution has 
the burden to rebut the defendant's evidence and prove predisposition beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Jd. Third, the court must decide "whether the entrapment evaluation should be submitted 
to a jury" because factual issues are in dispute or because reasonable persons could draw 
different conclusions from the facts. Jd. at 100. 
A. Inducement Analysis 
Inducement is "[a]ny government act creating substantial risk that an otherwise law-
abiding citizen would commit an offense, including persuasion, fraudulent misrepresentations, 
threats, coercive tactics, harassment, promises of reward, or pleas based on need, sympathy or 
friendship." Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393, 395 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (quoting United States v. 
Davis, 36 F. 3d 1424, 1430 (9th Cir. 1994). Accordingly, "[a]n 'inducement' consists of an 
'opportunity' plus something else-typically excessive pressure by the government upon the 
defendant or the government's taking advantage of an alternative, non-criminal type of motive." 
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United States v. Gendron, 18 F. 3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994). Thus, "the government may not play on 
the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguile him into committing crimes which he otherwise 
would not have attempted." Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 553 (1992). 
In support of his assertion that he was induced to commit the instant crimes, Defendant 
compares the government's actions in this case to those in Munoz v. State, 629 So. 2d 90 (Fla. 
1993); Beattie v. State, 636 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); and Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393 
(Fla. 4th DCA 2001). In Munoz, the defendant was the owner of a video store that provided X-
rated video tapes. Although the government had no complaints that the defendant had been 
providing these tapes to minors, it sent a sixteen-year-old female into the store to rent one of 
these tapes. The girl was given a store membership card belonging to a thirty-four-year-old 
male. Upon entering the store, the girl entered a separate room with a sign posted on the door 
that explicitly stated that no person under the age of 18 was allowed to enter the room. The girl 
chose a video from the room and proceeded to the counter to rent the video. She provided the 
membership card of the thirty-four-year-old male and instructed the defendant that she was his 
girlfriend. As a result, the girl was permitted to rent the X-rated video. On a second attempt, the 
defendant asked the girl her age and she lied, explaining that she had forgotten her driver's 
license and insisting that she had rented one of these movies before. Again, the girl claimed to 
be either the girlfriend or the sister of the man to whom the membership belonged. The 
defendant again allowed the girl to rent the X-rated video, and he was subsequently charged with 
the sale or distribution of harmful materials to a minor. Without much discussion, the Supreme 
Court concluded that these facts "clearly establish" that the government had induced the 
defendant to rent the video tapes to the girl. 
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In Beattie v. State, 636 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994), U.S. customs officials placed an 
advertisement in a local, free shopping publication, providing the name and address for a 
distributor of "hard to find Foreign videos/magazines in Miniature & Young Love." The 
defendant read the advertisement and responded by letter stating that he was interested in videos 
"with very young people and with Black men, white women." Thereafter, the customs officials 
and the defendant exchanged several letters discussing the types of movies available, film titles, 
prices, and usual lengths of time from order to delivery. Eventually, the customs officials and 
the defendant set up a time to meet to provide the defendant with a child pornography tape. 
After the exchange was made, the defendant was arrested by Florida law enforcement officials. 
In a sworn motion, the defendant alleged that prior to the offense, the defendant had never 
possessed or attempted to possess any child pornography materials and that he had never been 
investigated for such an offense. 
Applying the test set forth in Munoz, the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that 
the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law. Again, without much discussion, the court 
stated that "[b]y his sworn motion, [the defendant] satisfied his burden on the first question by 
proving that an agent of the government induced [him] to commit the offense of possession of 
illegal contraband relating to a sexual performance by a child." Id. at 746. 
Finally, in Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), the Broward County 
Sheriffs Office was alerted that the defendant's name was found on a list uncovered in a child 
pornography investigation in Texas. As a result, the Sheriffs Office sent the defendant a spam 
email inviting those looking for "hard to find" sexual materials to visit a fictitious company 
website. The email also contained assurances that any communication with the company would 
be protected from government interference. Upon receiving the email, the defendant visited the 
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website and input a request for specific pictures of teenage boys. In response, a detective sent 
the defendant an email requesting more specific details regarding the defendant's preferences. 
After an exchange of emails in which the detective sought, and the defendant provided, more and 
more specific details, the detective provided the defendant with an order form and the defendant 
placed his order. Thereafter, the two arranged to meet for the delivery of the videos, and the 
defendant was subsequently arrested. 
The defendant raised the defense of entrapment, and the Fourth District Court of Appeal 
concluded that he had been entrapped as a matter of law. In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
relied on the Second District's opinion in Beattie and found that the conduct of the government 
had progressed from "innocent lure" to "frank offer," as required for inducement. Specifically, 
the Court noted that "[w]hat began as a plan to possibly uncover an offender from the Texas list, 
became a concerted effort to lure Farley into committing a crime." Id. at 396. 
In each of these three cases, the courts found it significant that the defendants had been 
targeted arbitrarily, without any evidence that the defendant was already engaged in criminal 
activity. In addition, in Beattie and Farley, the courts showed concern over the exchange of 
correspondence that ensued between the government officials and the defendants after the initial 
advertisement. 
Just as in the other cases, the Defendant in this case was not targeted due to any suspicion 
that he was currently engaged in some criminal activity. To the contrary, Defendant responded 
to a widely disseminated advertisement, just as the defendant in Beattie did. In this case, 
however, the advertisement did not allude to "young love"; the advertisement here referred only 
to a consensual sexual encounter between adults. More importantly, unlike the defendants in 
Beattie and Farley, the Defendant in this case did not respond to the advertisement by 
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immediately seeking an encounter with a minor. Instead, Defendant sought only to meet the "hot 
single mom of one." In fact, Defendant did not manifest any intent to perform sexual acts with 
the minor until there had been an exchange of several emails and prodding by Agent Woessen. 
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the government conduct in the present case exceeds that in 
Beattie and Farley. 
The State, on the other hand, contends that Defendant's circumstances are more similar to 
those in Mareel v. State, 841 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003), in which the Fourth District Court 
of Appeal concluded that the defendant had not been entrapped. In Mareel, a special agent 
entered a chatroom entitled "Married Wants Affair" and posed as a fifteen-year-old girl named 
Kelly. The defendant entered the same chatroom and engaged "Kelly" in conversation. When 
the defendant asked "Kelly" if she was married, "Kelly" told the defendant that she was only 15. 
Upon learning that "Kelly" was a minor, the defendant asked her for a picture, asked if she was 
looking for "older guys," and asked if she was "looking for just a sexual relationship." When 
"Kelly" responded that she was "maybe" looking for something sexual, the two discussed the 
possibility of meeting and the sexual "touching" that would occur if they met. Throughout the 
next several weeks, the defendant and "Kelly" engaged in many emails, online chats, and 
telephone calls. Eventually, they arranged to meet at a local McDonalds, and the defendant was 
arrested. 
In a pre-trial motion to dismiss, the defendant argued that he had been entrapped. The 
trial court disagreed. Significantly, the court noted that "Kelly" had immediately identified 
herself as a minor; yet, the defendant was undeterred and asked her if she was interested in a 
sexual relationship within the first 14 minutes of talking to her. On appeal, the Fourth District 
Court agreed, stating that '''Kelly' merely created an opportunity for appellant to attempt to lure 
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or entice a minor to participate in sexual activities. There were no coercive tactics or 'arm-
twisting' on the part of law enforcement; [the defendant] was already on the 'iniquitous path.'" 
Id. at 603. 
This Court concludes that Mareel is distinguishable from the instant case. In Mareel, the 
agent immediately identified himself as a "15-year-old girl"; whereas in this case, Agent 
Woes sen played the part of an adult female and did not mention the idea of a minor until several 
hours and many emails into the conversation. More importantly, when the defendant in Mareel 
learned that he was dealing with a minor, he immediately asked if she was interested in a sexual 
relationship, without any prodding or encouragement from the special agent. In this case, on the 
other hand, it was Agent Woes sen, not Defendant, who initiated the idea of the sexual encounter 
with a minor. Moreover, upon learning that this was Agent Woessen's intent, Defendant did not 
immediately jump at the opportunity to engage in sexual acts with the minor. First, Defendant 
clarified with Agent Woessen that she did, in fact, want Defendant to engage in sexual acts with 
her "daughter." Second, Defendant asked if this was even legal. Then, when Agent Woes sen 
asked Defendant what he could teach her "daughter," he gave a description of acts that was less 
than explicit. Finally, after Agent Woessen asked Defendant for additional details on what 
exactly Defendant would teach the "daughter" in bed, Defendant provided Agent Woessen with 
the sexual description that she had apparently been looking for. Accordingly, Agent Woes sen 
did more than merely create an opportunity for Defendant to attempt to participate in sexual 
activities with a minor; she made a concerted effort to lead Defendant down a path which he 
would not otherwise have taken. Therefore, the Court concludes that it is not bound by the 
decision in Mareel. 
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Another case, on the other hand, is much more on point with the present matter. In fact, 
the facts in Morgan v. State, 38 Fla. L. Weekly D991 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) are nearly identical to 
those in this case. In Morgan, which was decided by the Fifth District Court of Appeal only a 
month ago, a detective placed an advertisement in the "casual encounters" section of Craig's 
List, entitled "Open Minded Mom looking to share intimate fun-w4m-38.,,4 The defendant 
responded to the advertisement, and eventually, the idea of a fictional 12-year-old "daughter" 
was introduced into the equation. The defendant "repeatedly expressed reservations about the 
daughter, but did not terminate the dialogue. He indicated his desire to be intimate with the 
'mother' and kept hedging as to any involvement with the daughter .... " Id. Eventually, the 
parties set up a location to meet, and the defendant was arrested. 
On appeal, the Fifth District Court noted, without discussion, that the trial court had 
properly denied a motion to dismiss based on entrapment. However, the court ultimately held 
that the trial court had erred when it declined to instruct the jury on the defense of entrapment. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated: 
Unlike circumstances where the suspect is communicating with a 
person believed to be a minor, the defendant responded to an 
advertisement for a casual encounter with an adult female. When 
the law enforcement officer interjected the prospect of including a 
minor, Morgan expressed reservations and was equivocal in his 
responses. We recognize that most within our society would 
immediately terminate the conversation upon the mention of the 
involvement of a minor, and perhaps the jury will reject the 
defense. However, there is at least some evidence with which the 
defense could suggest that Morgan was entrapped. The failure to 
give a jury instruction on entrapment was error. 
Accordingly, the Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized that the scenario we have in 
this case is sufficient to support the defense of entrapment. Unfortunately, the court declined to 
4 "w4m" signifies a woman seeking a man; "38" indicates her age. 
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provide more specific factual circumstances with respect to the government's actions in this case 
and whether those actions amounted to "inducement." As such, this Court is left to conclude that 
there were factual discrepancies in Morgan, with respect to either the government inducement or 
the defendant's predisposition, that were left to the province of the jury. See Munoz, 629 So. 2d 
at 100. Nevertheless, the Court finds that the Fifth District's concern over the law enforcement 
officer interjecting the prospect of a minor into the equation is significant. 
Therefore, upon extensive review of the case law as applied to the instant facts, the Court 
concludes that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating that he was induced to commit the 
crimes of which he is now charged. 
B. Predisposition Analysis 
Having concluded that Defendant was induced to commit the present crimes, the Court 
must now tum to the issue of predisposition. Predisposition turns on "whether the accused was 
awaiting any propitious opportunity or was ready and willing, without persuasion, to commit the 
offense." Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. "Predisposition is ... not present when [a defendant] has no 
prior criminal history related to the offense at issue." Farley, 848 So. 2d at 396. A defendant 
has also been found not to be predisposed where the defendant was not targeted by law 
enf?rcement and "was not known for deviant behavior" prior to the incident at issue. ld. 
"Evidence of predisposition is limited to the extent it demonstrates predisposition on the part of 
the accused both prior to and independent of the government acts. Further, care must be taken in 
establishing the predisposition of a defendant based on conduct that results from the 
inducement." Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. 
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In the present case, Defendant has demonstrated that he was not under investigation by 
law enforcement prior to committing this crime. Moreover, Defendant has no criminal history, 
let alone criminal history related to the instant offense. Accordingly, the facts of this case, with 
respect to Defendant's predisposition, are similar to those in Farley, 848 So. 2d at396, in which 
the court found it significant that the defendant had never been arrested for anything in his life, 
let alone for the offense for which he was currently charged. The court also noted that the 
defendant had not been "involved in an existing criminal undertaking in need of detection by law 
enforcement; rather, [the government] sought to manufacture crime based on a list of names and 
addresses of unknown origin." Id. at 397. 
Therefore, the Court finds that the Defendant has satisfied his burden of proving that he 
was not predisposed to commit the offenses at issue. See Munoz, supra; Farley, supra. Thus, 
the burden shifts to the prosecution to rebut this evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Munoz, 
629 So. 2d at 99. 
"In rebutting the defendant's lack of predisposition, the prosecution may make 'an 
appropriate and searching inquiry' into the conduct of the accused and present evidence of the 
accused's prior criminal history." Id. Here, the only evidence presented by the State to support a 
finding of predisposition is the exchange of emails. Although the "ready commission of the 
criminal act amply demonstrates the defendant's predisposition,"S those are not the facts of this 
case. The Defendant in this case was hesitant when the issue of a minor was introduced, and he 
required guidance by Agent Woessen before committing the crime. Cj United States v. 
Gendron, 18 F. 3d 955 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding predisposition when the defendant met the initial 
opportunity "with enthusiasim"). Accordingly, when the only evidence of predisposition is not 
5 Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549 (1992). 
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independent but rather is a product of the government's inducement to commit the offense, the 
state's burden has not been met. See Jacobson v. u.s., 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992). Therefore, the 
Court concludes that the State has failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendant was predisposed to commit this crime. See Munoz, 629 So. 2d at 99. 
C. Analysis of Submission to a Jury 
Finally, "[t]he third question under the subjective test is whether the entrapment 
evaluation should be submitted to ajury." Id. at 100. Fla. Stat. § 777.201 provides that the issue 
of entrapment shall be submitted to the trier of fact; "[h]owever, when the factual issues ... are 
not in dispute, 'then the trial judge has the authority to rule on the issue of predisposition as a 
matter of law.'" State v. Ramos, 632 So. 2d 1078, 1079 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citing Munoz, 629 
So. 2d at 100). In the present case, the issues of fact are not in dispute. Therefore, upon diligent 
consideration, the Court finds that the Defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, it is hereby, 
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant's "Amended Motion to Dismiss Based 
on Entrapment" is GRANTED. 
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, at Bradenton, Manatee County, Florida, this 
~ day of June 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing order'las furnished by fax to E. Jon Weiffenbach, Esquire 
and by copy to Courtney Hollen, Esquire on this day of June, 2013. 
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